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Evidence	from	France:	The	impact	of	terrorism	on
representative	democracy
How	do	citizens	respond	to	terrorist	events?	Drawing	on	a	recent	study,	Steven	M.	Van
Hauwaert	and	Robert	A.	Huber	find	that	citizens	do	not	necessarily	respond	in	the	way
we	might	expect.	Citizens	do	not	increase	hostility	toward	‘out-groups’	as	a	direct
response	to	terrorism,	rather	they	increase	solidarity	within	their	‘in-group’	and	come
together	following	an	exogenous	shock.
While	most	scholarship	highlights	the	effect	of	terrorism	on	attitudes	towards	incumbents,	leadership	evaluations
and	electoral	behaviour,	terrorism	also	affects	the	public’s	commitment	to	democratic	ideals	and	the	social
foundations	of	liberal	democracy.	Recent	studies	in	this	regard	focus	on	electoral	implications,	policy	positions	and,
more	specifically,	out-group	perceptions.	While	insightful,	much	of	this	evidence	often	remains	topical,	as	well	as
observational.	In	a	recent	study,	we	complement	this	extant	scholarship	by	first,	designing	a	two-dimensional
analytical	framework	that	simultaneously	examines	solidarity	amongst	citizens	(in-group)	and	the	opinions	of	and
interactions	with	communal	“others”	(out-group),	and	second,	by	leveraging	a	regression	discontinuity	design	that
provides	more	quasi-experimental	insights.
Most	terrorism	literature	generalises	from	post-9/11	findings,	while	European	cases	receive	much	less	attention.
This	is	unfortunate,	as	suggestive	accounts	of	American	exceptionalism	and	the	specificities	of	9/11	indicate	that
other	contexts	merit	separate	attention.	We	therefore	shift	our	geographic	focus	to	France	and	examine	to	what
extent	the	emblematic	November	2015	events	in	Paris	and	Saint	Denis	affected	citizens.	We	rely	on	a	unique
opinion	barometer	by	the	Direction	de	la	recherche,	des	études,	de	l’évaluation	et	des	statistiques	(DREES)	that
was	in	the	field	at	the	time	of	the	events	to	examine	how	exactly	citizens	responded	to	them.	We	formulate	two	sets
of	expectations.
We	argue	citizens	generally	respond	to	non-domestic	terrorist	events	by	challenging	some	of	the	social	foundations
of	liberal	democracy,	most	notably	by	increasing	out-group	hostilities	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	terrorism.
Collective	threats	can	easily	be	translated	into	negative	perceptions	of	foreign	elements	and	increasing	hostility
towards	minority	groups.	In	this	regard,	terrorist	events	amplify	negative	sentiments	towards	specific	out-groups,
particularly	those	perceived	to	be	linked	to	the	perpetrators.	Recent	evidence	shows	this	was	the	case	after	the
2004	Madrid	bombing	and	the	2015	Paris	events.	We	therefore	anticipated	a	spike	in	the	issue	salience	of
immigration,	as	well	as	an	increase	in	anti-immigrant	sentiments.	In	light	of	recent	studies	on	Israel	and	Turkey,	we
simultaneously	expected	that	citizens	directly	affected	by	terrorism	would	be	more	prone	to	polarise	and	identify
with	the	political	extremes.
Yet,	terrorist	events	do	not	merely	challenge	liberal	democracy.	They	also	provide	very	specific	routes	to
consolidate	its	social	foundations	and	strengthen	in-group	solidarity.	When	confronted	by	collective	threats,	citizens
in	liberal	democracies	typically	express	a	growing	desire	for	social	unity.	They	frequently	reinforce	their	in-group
reflections	and	evaluations	of	the	political	community	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	non-domestic	terrorism.
Evidence	following	9/11	and	the	2004	Madrid	bombing	suggests	that,	after	terrorist	events,	citizens	also	identify
more	with	their	country,	as	well	as	government	institutions,	political	leaders	and	law	enforcement.	That	is,	terrorist
events	have	the	potential	to	mobilise	citizens	(e.g.	by	increasing	participation)	and	bring	a	population	together	(e.g.
through	a	rally	effect).	We	therefore	expected	social	cohesion	amongst	citizens,	feelings	of	in-group	integration	and
trust	in	the	country’s	political	institutions	to	increase	following	terrorist	events.
The	results	of	our	study	were	somewhat	surprising.	Figure	1	visualises	our	findings	for	citizens’	out-group	hostilities.
The	left	panel	highlights	that	anti-immigration	opinions	are	quite	dispersed	across	France	(Figure	1.A),	while	the
middle	panel	shows	that	a	majority	of	French	citizens	find	immigration	to	be	quite	important	(Figure	1.B).	More
importantly,	neither	panel	provides	conclusive	evidence	of	clear	changes	after	the	terrorist	events.	Perhaps
surprisingly,	this	suggests	that,	despite	the	framing	of	the	terrorist	events	in	terms	of	security	and	immigration,
citizens	did	not	necessarily	respond	to	(this)	terrorist	threat	through	the	lens	of	immigration.	Even	more,	in	line	with
a	recent	study	by	Bruno	Castanho	Silva,	anti-immigrant	opinions	and	the	salience	of	immigration	appear	largely
unwavering.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Evidence from France: The impact of terrorism on representative democracy Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-07-23
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/07/23/evidence-from-france-the-impact-of-terrorism-on-representative-democracy/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Figure	1:	The	evolution	of	out-group	variables
Note:	The	cut-off	point	(dashed	line)	is	14	November	2015,	as	the	terrorist	events	occurred	in	the	night	of	13	November.	No
respondents	were	interviewed	the	day	after	the	events	(Sunday,	15	November).	The	spline	represents	a	locally	weighted	regression
line	(loess).
The	right	panel	(Figure	1.C)	assesses	political	polarisation	and	illustrates	the	lack	of	centrifugal	movement	of
citizens	in	ideological	or	political	terms.	The	public	does	not	move	towards	the	political	extremes,	and	citizens	do
not	distance	themselves	further	from	their	ideological	counterparts	following	the	terrorist	events.	Altogether,	while
we	expected	the	terrorist	events	to	challenge	some	of	the	social	foundations	of	liberal	democracy,	the	different
indicators	in	Figure	1	suggest	little	to	no	relevant	changes	in	out-group	hostility	as	a	direct	reaction	to	the	terrorist
events.
Figure	2	shows	our	findings	for	citizens’	in-group	solidarity.	The	left	panel	(Figure	2.A)	indicates	the	perceived	social
cohesion	amongst	French	citizens	is	rather	low,	whereas	the	middle	panel	(Figure	2.B)	highlights	the	societal
integration	levels	are	higher.	Regardless	of	the	absolute	levels,	we	also	observe	a	sizeable	shift	towards	higher
perceived	cohesion	and	integration	after	the	terrorist	events.	In	line	with	then-president	Hollande’s	infamously	low
approval	ratings,	as	well	as	equally	low	public	satisfaction	with	then-prime	minister	Valls,	the	right	panel	(Figure
2.C)	indicates	limited	trust	in	the	central	government’s	abilities	before	the	terrorist	events.	We	do,	however,	observe
a	significant	post-terror	shift	towards	more	trust	in	government.
Figure	2:	The	evolution	of	in-group	solidarity
Note:	The	cut-off	point	(dashed	line)	is	14	November	2015,	as	the	terrorist	events	occurred	in	the	night	of	13	November.	No
respondents	were	interviewed	the	day	after	the	events	(Sunday,	15	November).	The	spline	represents	a	locally	weighted	regression
line	(loess).
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Figure	2	thereby	suggests	the	public	responds	to	terrorist	events	with	increased	in-group	solidarity.	At	least	in	the
immediate	aftermath,	citizens	come	together	and	express	trust	in	their	leaders	following	collective	threats.	While
such	rally	effects	are	not	an	uncommon	finding	in	the	terrorism	literature,	they	are	nonetheless	remarkable	in	times
where	the	representative	character	of	liberal	democracy	is	under	tremendous	pressure.	Particularly,	in	a	centralised
and	elitist	country	like	France,	this	suggests	citizens	are	not	necessarily	rejecting	politics	as	such	but	might	be
dissatisfied	with	the	implementation	of	representation	by	their	elites.
The	combined	findings	confirm	the	democratic	resilience	we	know	citizens	to	have.	Our	study	shows	that,	much	like
an	undeserved	World	Cup	semi-final	victory	(e.g.	France	–	Belgium	in	2018),	critical	events	can	bring	a	country
together	and	unite	its	citizens	–	even	if	only	for	a	moment.	While	we	do	not	necessarily	want	to	argue	that	terrorism
contributes	to	democratic	consolidation,	we	do	highlight	that	instant	threats	to	democracy	do	not	necessarily
undermine	citizens’	responsiveness	and	their	support	for	some	of	the	central	pillars	of	liberal	and	representative
democracy.	Even	more,	we	show	that	terrorist	events	can	improve	what	has	long	been	perceived	as	an	eroding
component	of	liberal	democracy,	namely	in-group	solidarity.	Terrorist	events	can	strengthen	the	popular	legitimacy
of	political	regimes	and	instigate	rally	effects	around	political	institutions.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	European	Journal	of	Political	Research
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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